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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN MORTGAGE LOAN 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
P lainti f !-Respondent, 
vs. 
COTTONWOOD CONSTRUCTION 
COMP ANY, a corporation, et al., 
Defendants, 
• • • • • 
OSCAR E. CHYTRAUS COMPANY, 
INC., a corporation, GIBBONS & 
REED CONCRETE PRODUCTS 
COMP ANY, a corporation, RICHARD 
P. GARR~CK, BOISE CASCADE 
CORPORATION, d/b/a BESTWAY 
BUILDING CENTER, a corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
10516 
In order that the court might have a true picture 
of the facts in this case, Respondent submits herewith its 
statement of facts for the Court's scrutiny. 
In November 1959, the owners of an unimproved 
tract of land situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
2 
entered into a real estate contract with Harrison and 
Moore, a partnership, for the sale and purchase of the 
tract of land for the sum of $8-±,000.00. In said contract 
the buyers agreed to develop a subdivision on said land, 
the sellers to be under no obligation or expense in con-
nection with the planning, approval and development of 
said subdivision. The Agreement further provided for a 
conveyance of lots in the subdivision on a lot release 
basis and in the event of buyers building houses on the 
lots, for subordination of buyers' obligation to the sellers 
to the lien of the construction mortgages. (R. 163-168) 
Harrison and Moore, in turn, contracted with James 
A. Finnegan, Jr., and wife, under date of August 18, 1960. 
Finnegans later assigned their interest to Cottonwood 
Construction Company, a corporation. (R 169-177) 
County approval for Lazy Bar Subdivision was ob-
tained in the latter part of 1960. 
From the latter part of 1959 to October of 1960, 
Charles D. King surveyed the land, platted it, placed 
visible stakes upon the ground, marking the lots, includ-
ing Lot 10, thus defining the intended subdivision devel-
opment. (R 69) 
Lloyd Jackson and Rex L. Jackson then installed the 
roads, curb and gutter, sidewalks, water mains, sewer 
mains and sewer laterals. Installation of the sewer mains 
and laterals was completed about January 1, 1961 and the 
dirt removed from the trenches was replaced and rough 
graded. (Note that this took place 22 months before con-
struction of the home started on Lot 10) 
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The other off-site improvements were made as stated 
in Appellants' Brief. 
Application for construction financing on Lot 10 was 
made to Western Mortgage Loan Corporation and ap-
proved. The note and mortgage in the amount of $15,-
750.00 were executed October 29, 1962 and the mortgage 
was recorded the same day. 
Contrary to Appellants' contention that there was no 
commitment of funds to the account by ~Western, upon re-
ceiving the executed note and mortgage, Western im-
mediately assigned both documents to the First Security 
Bank of Utah, N.A. hereafter referred to as First Secur-
ity Bank, as security for a loan equal to 80% of the face 
amount of the note. First Security Bank then created a 
special non-interest bearing account in vVestern's favor, 
denominated as a Ban Control Account nnd credited the 
same with the sum of $12,600.00, being 80% of the face 
amount of the note. A separate Ban Control Account was 
created for each lot. Western also maintained its general 
checking account with the same bank. After Western 
made each disbursement for Lot 10, First Security Bank 
would debit the particular Ban Control Account and 
credit Vv estern's general checking account with the exact 
amount of the disbursement. 
Before Cottonwood Construction Company could re-
ceive title to Lot 10 and execute a valid first mortgage, a 
lot release price o.f $500.00 had to be paid to the fee title 
owners. vVestern advanced this sum as a short term loan, 
as well as monies for title insurance, hazard insurance 
and recording fees on Lot 10 and after the construction 
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loan was paid, charged said items against it as an ex-
pense. In addition, Western charged against the con-
struction loan its service charge and interest charges as 
the same accumulated. Neither the lot release price, nor 
any of the other charges just mentioned were reimbursed 
from the Ban Control Account. The lot release price and 
said charges equaled at least 20% of the face amount of 
the note, so that Western, in fact, committed in advance 
all of the funds shown in the note and mortgage on Lot 10. 
The discretion allowed Western in Schedule "A" 
relates only to the amounts and time thereof and not to 
the ultimate duty of Western to disburse funds equal to 
the face amount of the note. 
In the Pre-construction Affidavit, Finnegan and an 
associate stated that no work has been started and no 
materials furnished for Lot 10. 
The mortgage for Lot 10 was recorded prior to the 
furnishing of any labor or materials for the building of 
the house on said lot. 
As shown by its ledger, vVestern attributed advances 
to Lot 10 at frequent intervals from October 31, 1962 to 
January 24, 1963. (R. 151, Exhibit M-84) At about this 
time Western learned that some of the money advanced 
to Cottonwood had not been paid to some of the material 
suppliers. Western then informed Cottonwood that no 
further funds would be advanced on the mortgage until 
Cottonwood furnished the balance of properly executed 
lien waivers covering all advances to date. This, Cotton-
wood failed to do. 
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Paragraph 10 of the loan agreement provided that 
upon default of the borrower, including work stoppage 
by the lender under the terms of the agreement, the lender 
could, at its option, (1) declare all indebtedness secured 
by the mortgage immediately due and payable and be 
released from all further obligation to the borrower or 
(2) take possession of the premises, finish improvements 
and pay the costs thereof out of the funds in the account. 
(R. 151, Exhibits W-2) These rights of the lender were 
cumulative and not to the prejudice of any other rights 
under its mortgage. Respondent wishes to call attention 
to the exact language o,f paragraph 10 of the loan agree-
ment which Appellants chose to alter in their statement 
of facts. (Appellants' Brief. pp. 7 and 8) 
When it became apparent that Cottonwvod had mis-
applied funds advanced to it by Western, the lien claim-
ants met with Western to determine what course of action 
should be taken. Western was urged by Jim Reed, one 
of the managers of Boise Cascade, the appellant, to allow 
the project to continue by making funds available. It 
was agreed by the lien claimants and Western that Cot-
tonwood should convey title to the property to Security 
Title Company, as trustee for Western and the lien claim-
ants, and that in order to mitigate the damages, Western 
should continue to advance the funds from the mortgage 
account to complete the houses which were in various 
stages of construction - exposed to the weather, unten-
antable and subject to acts of vandalism - worthless iil 
such condition to serve the purpose for which they were 
being constructed. On the strength of this agreement, 
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Cottonwood conveyed the property to Security Title , 
Company, as Trustee for vVestern and the lien claimants. 
Arlen Fox, secretary of Cottonwood was hired to super-
vise the work required to finish the houses. The same lien 
claimants, suppliers and laborers were used as had been 
used from the beginning of the project and Western paid 
for all work and materials furnished from the date of 
the resumption of work. Negotiations involving the pro-
posed agreement were protracted due to the number of 
lien claimants involved and the complexities of the situ-
ation. In the meantime, other creditors began to file ' 
actions against Cottonwood. It soon became apparent to 
Western that the only solution to the problem was to 
commence foreclosure of the construction mortgages so 
this action (and its companion cases) was filed. To fur-
ther mitigate the damages occasioned by this involved 
situation the houses were rented as completed. The house 
on Lot 10 was rented in August 1964. It has been occupied 
by tenants ever since. The yard has been landscaped, the 
value of the house increased, rents have been collected 
and are being held by Western pending the disposition of 
this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT vV AS CORRE1CT IN AC-
CORDING PRIORITY TO ADVANCES MADE UN-
DER THE CONSTRUCTION l\IORTGAGE OF WEST-
ERN MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORATION IN LIGHT 
OF EXISTING STATUTORY AND CASE LAW. 
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(A) THE CONSTRUCTION LOAN AGREEMENT 
CREATED THE OBLIGATION OF THE 
MORTGAGEE AND ALL AD\'ANCES MADE 
THEREUNDER TOOK PRIORITY AS OF 
THE TIME OF RmCORDATION OF THE 
MORTGAGE.1 
The mortgage transaction in issue had for its pur-
pose the securing of progress payments under a con-
struction loan agreement. This arrangement contemplated 
the advancement of funds at various stages of develop-
ment until the improvements were completed in accord-
ance with settled plans and specifications. 
In Utah as in other jurisdictions which favor prior 
recorded mortgages over later liens, disbursement of 
funds by the mortgagee as the terms of the loan agree-
ment require has been deemed sufficient to confer pri-
ority for all such advancements as of the time of recorda-
tion of the rnortgage.2 
In C1tlmer Paint and Glass Co. v. Gleason, 42 U. 344, 
130 Pac. 66 ( 1913) certain mortgages were "given for the 
express purpose of raising funds to construct (a) build-
ing" and the mortgagee was to 
" ... pay out the money as the building pro-
gressed .... " 
1. Respondent will not depart from the usual and accepted terminology, 
viz.: "obligatory or optional" - in presenting its case concerning the 
nature of the advances made under its construction mortgage. Suffice 
it to say, that the terms emplC!yed by appellants, "volitional or n~n­
volitional," are nowhere recogruzed by the case law or commentanes 
on this subject, and one can only speCTJ!ate as to why appellants felt 
it desirable to by-pass the accepted termmology. 
2. Utah Code Anno. 1953, 38-1-5. The prevailing view as to th.e nai1;lre 
of construction mortgage advances is noted throughout the discussion 
of Point I, but see particularly the authorities at p. 16-24. 
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The mortgages were held to take priority over a sub-
sequently arising mechanic's lien to the extent that ad-
vances were actually made under the mortgage. 
Again in Utah Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Mecham, 11 
U. 2d 159, 366 P. 2d 598 (1961), mortgag~s regular in form 
which were given to secure funds for the development 
of a subdivision were accorded priority over the claims 
of materialmen who delivered supplies subsequent to 
recordation of the mortgages. This Court stated in re-
sponse to the argument that no obligation existed to 
make the advances : 
"A mortgagee who is loaning money to a mortga-
gor-borrower is obliged to pay out the money in 
accordance with the directions of the borrower. 
This is especially so where, as in the instant case, 
a sum certain is stated in the mortgage and no 
provisions are made for future advances." 
The appellants do not assert that the Culmer and 
Mecham cases were decided erroneously, nor do they dis-
pute the rationale upon which the construction mortgages 
in these cases were accorded priority.3 Ordinarily, there-
fore, it would seem the appellants could have no valid 
3. The equitable basis for priority has frequently been noted, e.g., in 
Kiene u. Hodge, 57 N.W. 717, the court stated: "The lots, independent 
of the buildings, were not sufficient security for the loan . . . The 
equities are strong in favor of the (mortgagees). At the time defend-
ants commenced to furnish the lumber for which their liens are claimed, 
the records indicated the lien of the (mortgagees), and they engaged 
in the transaction in the full light of the facts." 
See also Scholl Priorities Between Mechanic's Liens and Construction 
Loan Mortgag~s in Alabama, 23 Ala. Law. 398 (1963): "The theory 
behind the statutes in jurisdictions giving priority to the construction 
loan mortgagee . . . is that the . . . mortgagee has contributed. ~ 
much or more to the improvement of the land as have the mecharuc s 
lienors. This seems to be a perfectly realistic approach .... " 
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since the mortgage here was regular in form and clearly 
secured typical construction outlays. 
However, the appellants would deny such priority 
solely on the basis of those provisions of the loan docu-
ments governing disbursement of funds. Basically, the 
contention is that no obligation existed on the part of the 
mortgagee to advance funds because of the right retained 
to exercise discretion in making the advancements. 
In examining the merit of this contention, the doc-
trine of future advances as it relates to construction mort-
gages must necessarily be considered at the outset; there-
after the question of whether the disbursement procedure 
adopted here requires a different result will be consid-
ered. 
NATURE OF CONSTRUCTION LOAN AGREEMENT 
Appellants state the general rule that advances which 
the mortgagee is obligated to make will take priority 
over intervening liens while optional or voluntary take 
priority only as of the time each is made. However, ap-
pellants thereafter make no meaningful attempt to dif-
ferentiate between the different types of security devices 
to which the principle is applicable, nor are they at all 
helpful on its specific application to construction mort-
gages. 
It is important to note that there are a number of 
transactions in which a mortgage may secure future 
10 
advances. 3a One of the most frequently employed today 
is the so-called "optional advance" or "open-end" mort-
gage. Basically a standard mortgage taken on existing 
security, the open-end mortgage contains an additional 
clause permitting future advances to be made at the 
lender's option. Its usefulness in establishing a continu-
ous line of credit to homeowners for needed repairs, 
additions to existing structures, etc. is well knmvn! How-
ever, it is clearly distinguishable from the construction 
mortgage which is taken no,t on the security of land or 
on land and existing improvements but only on the se-
curity that improvements will be erected in accordance 
with predetermined plans. 
The distinction is made quite clear in the very source 
appellants have urged the Court to accept as authority 
for their argument. Thus at p. 20 of appellants' brief, 
the following appears : 
"In the third type, the mortgage will provide ex-
pressly for the making of future advances, but the 
making of these advancements is strictly within 
the discretion of the mortgagee. Such a device is 
termed a mortgage to secure 'optional future ad-
vances.' " Blackburn, Mortgages to Secure Future 
Advances, 21 Mo. L. Rev. 209 (1956). 
This statement apparently is intended to be relevent to 
the security device, i.e., construction mortgage, now before 
the court. 
3a. Osborne, for example, lists in addition. to i:onstruction loans, "mort-
gages by way of indemnity for ~rospEctive mdor~ements; guarantees 
and accommodations of commercial paper to be ISsued by the mort-
gagor; fluctuating current balances under line~ of credit, .established 
with th? mortgagee; and security for a bond issue or senes of bond 
issues." Osborne, Mortgages §113. 
4. 65 Harvard Law Review 478 (1952) 
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Actually, the author does no.t end his statement quite as 
indicated by the quote. Rather, the latter sentence in full 
reads this way: 
"Such a device is termed a mortgage to secure 
'optional future advances,' bid currently is be-
coming more familiarly known as am 'open-end 
mortgage'." (emphasis supplied) 
When the author turns to obligatory advance mort-
gages and construction financing, he states: 
"A typical example of the obligatory form is found 
in commercial construction projects where the 
lender is contraetually bound to make subsequent 
advances to cover the costs as the wo.rk pro-
gresses." (p. 219) 
This accurately reflects the view the courts have 
overwhelmingly adopted with regard to construction 
mortgages. That is, the agreement to disburse as con-
struction progresses creates the obligation sufficient to 
protect the advances made pursuant thereto. 
The Culmer and 111 echam cases so held, and the fol-
lowing are but a few examples of cases in accord: 
Boise Payette Lumber Co. v. Winward, 47 Idaho 485, 
276 Pac. 971 (1929): 
"We think it cannot be questioned, that under the 
contract, the mortgagee's obligation was to ad-
vance the balance of the funds upon compliance 
with the condition of the agreement, viz. : the im-
provement of the premises. The premises were 
improved and the mortgagee became bound by 
virtue of the original agreement to advance the 
specified sum to pay therefor." (emphasis sup-
plied) 
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Landers-Morrison-Christensen Co. v. Ambassador 
Holding Co., 214 N.W. 503 (Minn. 1927): 
"The contract between the corporation and the 
mortgage company imposed upon the company the 
duty to procure the necessary funds and make 
the stipulated advances as the building progressed. ' 
It cannot reasonably be construed as crea.ting a , 
mere option to make them. It created an obligation 
to make them; and the .advances having been made 
pursuant to that obligation they take pri.ority over 
the mechanic's lioos." (emphasis supplied) 
See also C. K. Wood Lumber Co. v. Mulholland, Calif. 
5 P. 2d 669 (1937),Hammond Lumber Co. v. Roubian, 
Calif. (1934) 30 P. 2 440, Smith v. Anglo-California, Calif. 
(1928), 271. Pac. 898, Hance Hardware Co. v. Denbigh 
Hall Inc., Del. (1930), 152 Atl. 130, Hyman v. Hauff, N.Y. 
(1893) 33 N.E. 735, Franklin Svgs & Ln Co. v. Fish, Fla. , 
(1929) 124 So. 42, Micele v. Faldutti, N.J. (1927) 137 Atl 
92, Security Stove & Mfg Co. v. Sellards, Kan (1931) 3 P. 
2d 484; and see cases collected in Annot. 80 A.L.R. 2d 
179, 191, Osborne, Mortgage ~ 120 n. 54. 
APPELLANTS' AUTHORITIES 
In view of the foregoing, it is instructive to consider 
the authorities offered by appellants :5 
·. 
Superior Lumber Co. v. National Bank of Commerce, • 
Ark. (1928) 2 S.W. 2d 1093, Balch v. Chaffee, (1905) 47 
Atl. 327, and Carey v. Rufus Lillard Co., Okla. (1945) 
165 P. 2d 344, all involve "open-end" mortgages and do 
not in any way concern advances under a construction 
loan agreement. 
5. (See appelant's brief, p. 17.) 
·. 
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Heller v. Gate City Building and Loan Assoc., 75 
N.M. 596, 408 P. 2d 753, a decision which appears to weigh 
heavily in the balance with appellants, involves only 
the question of the lender's right to include certain costs 
of repair under the heading of preservation o.f security. 
It, too, contains no discussion or consideration of con-
struction loan advancements.6 
Other cases cited by appellants without further at-
tempt to relate them to the question before the court are: 
Finlwyson v. Crooks, Minn (1891) 49 N.W. 398, which 
considered the question of priority where the mortgage 
was recorded after the commencement of work on the 
improvements; Gray v. McClellan, 214 Mass. 92, 100 N.E. 
1093 (1913), involving an arrangement whereby certajn 
mortgages were placed on property, but it was expressly 
covenanted between the parties that, 
" ... they (mortgagor and mortgagee, respective-
ly,) would not demand either the amount agreed 
to be loaned, or the amount represented by each 
mortgage note or any part thereof. "8 
6. The open-end mortgage may be what the appellants have in mind 
in alleging the equitable basis for their contention, viz.: " ... the 
lender could with impunity advance or refuse to advance as it chose, 
swallowing up, at its own violition, and for its own benefit, the protec-
tion intended the mechanic's lienors." (p. 14, appellants' brief). Where 
sums may be advanced on an already existing improvement, as is 
typically the case under an open-end mortgage, it is possible for the 
mortgagee to attempt to "feed" his security at the expense of lien 
claimants by advancing funds after learning of additions or improve-
ments. However, where the security only comes into being as the im-
provements are made - as is true of construction loans--such an 
argument has no relevance or merit, and it is significant that it has 
never been given any credence in the cases. 
8. The inaptness of the Gray decision is made more graphic when con-
sidered in connection with Whelan v. Exchange Trust Co., 214 Mass. 
94, 100 N.E. 1095 (1913) decided the same day. Here the court was 
dealing with priority questions where normal construction progress 
payments were involved. Holding such outlays to be prior, the court 
stated: 
"It is uncontroverted that after deducting interest on the 
full amount, the remainder was credited on the books to the 
A. W. Sautter Building Account, upon which, as the value of 
the property was increased by the construction of the build-
ing, the mortgagor was permitted to draw .... It having been 
absolutely obligated to pay the loan named. in the mortgage, 
it is immaterial that only a very small portion had been thus 
transferred before the plaintiffs began work, or that before 
the entire amount had been disbursed the company received 
notice of the liens." (Emphasis supplied.) 
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W. P. Fuller & Co. v. M cClnre, 48 >Cal. App. 185, 191 Pac. 
1027 (1920), a case specifically held inapplicable to con-
struction mortgages in a later decision where the court 
was faced with the precise claim made by Etppellants here.' 
Yost-Linn Lumber Co. v. Williams, 9 P. 2d 324 and Elmen-
dorf-Anthony Co. v. Dunn, 10 w· ash. 2d 29, 116 P. 2d 253, 
both of which involved the issue of priority for advances 
made after default, and not the issue of whether the 
loan agreement provided for optional or obligatory ad-
vances; and, finally, Home Savings & Loan Association v. 
Sullivan, Okla, 284 Pac. 30 (1929), which is misleading 
unless considered in connection with later cases in the 
same jurisdiction which cast extreme doubt on its current 
validity.8 
With no meaningful qualification offered by appel-
lants to the general view of construction mortgages as 
7. See footnote 11, infra. 
Sa. The court in the Sullivan case did subordinate the advances made 
pursuant to a construction loan agreement on the ground that the 
option afforded to the mortgagee to withhold funds until lien claimants 
were paid rendered the mortgage one for optional advances. Local 
Federal Svgs. & Loan Ass'n. v. Davidson & Case Lumber Co., 255 P.2d 
248 (Okla. 1952) and Tul,sa Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Dale Lumber 
Co., 381 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1963), have all but rendered this decision 
null and of no effect. 
In the Davidson case, the loan proceeds were to be disbursed only upon 
the owner's showing that parties furnishing labor and materials had 
been paid. The court held all advances made under the morgtage to be 
entitled to priority over the claims of materialmen; the Sullivan case 
was distinguished on the ground that the agreement in !hat case_ g~ve 
the mortgagee the option to refrain from payment until the building 
had been completed. In the Tul,sa Ready-Mix case, the mortgagee had 
the right to pay loan proceeds directly to parties asserting liens against 
the property and deduct the amounts thereof from the amoun~ of 
the loan. The court was actually unable to distinguish the Sullivan 
case but stated that, 
". . . in any event, it was made clear in the Davidson case 
that the rule stated from C.J.S. (according priority to con-
struction mortgages generally, 57 C.J.S., Mechanic's liens 
§205 (b)) would be applied in cases such as this." 
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obligatory in form, it remains to consider the contention 
that the provisions covering disbursement under the 
present loan agreement require a different result. 
DISBURSEMENT PROVISIONS 
The substance of appellants' contention in this regard 
appears at page 11 of their brief, viz.: "Where the lender 
is bound to make the advances, he is unable to exercise 
discretion .... " Under this view it would follow that a 
construction mortgagee in order to achieve priority must 
be unilaterally bound to make advancements, regardless 
of other factors or conditions which normally qualify any 
such duty. 
Actually, this is quite inaccurate. Certainly a lender 
must be given the opportunity to determine if the payout 
is required considering the amount of work completed and 
the percentage of the contract already paid. 
The exercise of discretion is also required ( 1) where 
the work performed or materials furnished are defective 
or not in accord with specifications, or (2) where the work 
and materials are satisfactory but the owner nonetheless 
objects to disbursements on a wholly untenable ground. 
The right to withhold or refuse payment in the first in-
stance is self-evident; the following has been noted in 
connection with the second: 
". . . the authorization to disburse funds, included 
in the construction loan agreement, is an essential 
protection to the lending institution so that it may 
disburse funds at its discretion in the event of any 
disputes between owner and contractor wherein 
the owner is taking an unreasonable position." 
Conway, Mortgage Lending, 340 (1960) 
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Thus, the right to exercise discretion in making payouts 
may operate as much for the benefit of parties furnishing 
labor and materials as for the mortgagee. 
Professor Corbin notes other reasons for control over 
construction expenditures in discussing the position of the 
owner relative to performance by the contractor. It is 
apparent that his remarks are equally applicable to a con-
struction mortgagee, viz.: 
"In order to get the contract, a bidder may bid 
very low; later, in order to avoid loss, or in order 
to make his compensatory 'profit' a greater one, 
he may 'scamp his job.' There are numberless 
ways in which this can be done without discovery 
by the other party to the contract. ... A desired 
building can perhaps be procured by merely buying 
a contractor's promise to build it; a more effective 
method, however, is to buy his promise and also to 
make the return promise of compensation condi-
tional upon approved performance." (emphasis 
supplied) Corbin, Contracts § 650. 
This defines the issue clearly: the obligation of the 
mortgagee to disburse funds is contingent upon adequate 
performance justifying such disbursement. This concept 
is basic to construction financing and has been readily 
acknowledged in situations such as the present where lien 
claimants have sought to avoid a subordinate position by 
alleging absence of oblligation to disburse. 
Boise Payette Lumber Co. v. Winward, 47 Idaho 
485, 276 Pac. 971 (1929), rejected this contention: 
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" the mortgagee's obligation was to advance 
the balance of the funds represented by the mort-
gage note upon compliance by the mortgagor with 
the conditions of the agreement; viz.: the improve-
ment o.f the premises. The premises were improved 
and the mortgagee became bound by virtue of the 
original agreement to advance the specific sums 
to pay therefor." (emphasis supplied) 
Again, in Theilen v. Chandler, 9 Tenn. App. (1928), the 
court conluded: 
"It was not optional with McMillan to refuse to 
pay the advancements if the val·ue of the houses 
did justify further advancements. For when the 
value of the houses justified additional advance-
ments, McMillan's obligation to pay existed. The 
obligation to advance became absolute at the exe-
cution and registration of the trust deeds, condi-
tioned only upon the time of advancement and the 
value of the security." (emphasis supplied) 
In Hammond Lumber Co. v. Roubiarn, Calif. (1934) 30 P. 
2d 440, the contention of the lien claimants was stated 
thus: 
"Respondent . . . contends that the entire loan 
fund ... constituted an optional advance because 
under certain conditions the lender could not be 
compelled to advance the money and could stop 
payment." 
The court's reply goes to the heart of appellants' conten-
tion: 
"As we understand the cases cited, none of them 
are autho·rity for the proposition that where as in 
a case like this, the borrower has fully performed 
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on his part, the advances to be made under the 
agreement are optional with the lender."9 
The right reserved to the mortgagee to use its dis-
cretion in making payouts is thus nothing more than a 
recognition of an implied condition of the obligation to 
disburse; it does not relieve the mortgagee of the obliga-
tion to disburse when the condition has been met. 
The appellants' quarrel with this conclusion is fairly 
summarized by the following excerpt from page 17 of 
their brief: 
"Since the disbursements are relegated to the 'sole 
discretion' of the lender, no legal right inhered 
in the borrower to compel disbursement and no 
legal penalty could be imposed upon the lender if 
in its 'whole' or 'sole' discretion it determined no.t 
to disburse." 
Basically, then the appellants take this position: The 
mortgagee has reserved to itself the right to make dis-
bursements when in its discretion such payouts are re-
quired. It may therefore refuse to make any disburse-
ments by alleging that no payouts are warranted, or may 
simply decline to advance funds without justifying its 
9. The appellants will no doubt assert (as on page 10 of their brief) 
that there is no showing that the precise language under consideration 
here was present in the above cited cases. Is this really respondent's 
burden? It is admitted the transaction in issue is one involving con-
struction financing; the cases cited are of this type, and in addition 
considered and rejected the very claim now advanced by appellants. 
Is it not incumbent on appellants rather to distinguish these cases on 
some more solid ground? For, in view of what has been stated earlier 
as to the recognition of the need of a construction lender to exercise 
control over expenditures, it seems far more likely than not that lan-
guage similar to the present was contained in the loan agreements in 
the cases cited. 
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refusal at all, having always the right to exercise its dis-
cretion as it chooses. Thus, there is no obligation to ad-
vance funds and the promise of the mortgage to do so is 
illusory and unenforcible. 
This line of reasoning confuses the right to exercise 
discretion with the possibility that di~cretion may be 
used arbitrarily. That is, because one party is accorded 
the right of approval of performance as a condition to 
its own duty to perform, it follo~vs that there is no mu-
tuality of obligation because the possibility exists that the 
right may be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. This is 
totally at variance with settled rules of construction favor-
ing mutuality of obligation and imposing the condition 
of "reasonableness" upon the exercise of the right of dis-
cretion. 
Mattei v. Hooper, Calif. (1%8) 330 P. 2d 625, notes 
the general rule : 
"Contracts making the duty of performance of 
one of the parties conditional upon his 'satisfac-
tion' are upheld on the theory that the expression 
of dissatisfaction must be genuine and not arbi-
trary, and that an objective criterion-good faith 
-controls the right to determine satisfaction."'0 
10. See generally 3 Corbin, Contracts 644-647, 5 Williston, Contracts 
§675A (3rd ed.) 1961), 12 Am. Jur., Contracts 895-898, 17 C.J.S., Con-
tracts 1006-1010, Rodriguez v. Barnet, 338 P.2d 907 (1959) 
Paley v. Barton Savings and Loan Ass'n., 196 A. 2d 682 (1964), in-
volved a situation where defendant had reserved the right to reject 
mortgages under a purchase commitment which failed to receive its 
counsel's "approval." Rejecting the argument that no obligation ex-
isted, the court stated: "The significant consideration here is whether 
or not the parties intended to enter into a binding agreement ... As 
stated by Professor Corbin, 'If the parties have concluded a transaction 
in which it appears they intent to make a contract, the court should 
not frustrate their intention' . . . Thus any terms of the purchase 
commitment which were dependent upon defendant's satisfaction 
. . . would in the event of a dispute be construed by the court to be 
subject to the implied condition that the defendant's decision be reason-
able under the circumstances." 
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Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, 211 P. 2d 302, 19 A.L.R. 2d 
1268 (Cal. 1949), provides a helpful example of the rule's 
application. Here the matter in issue was a restriction in 
a deed against the erection of a dwelling house "until 
the plans and specifications with the proposed site there-
for have been ... approved" by a named party. It was 
contended that the restriction was not binding because, 
". . . if the defendant has the right to determine 
that a portion of a lot, regardless of its size, is not 
suitable for a dwelling, then it could make the same 
determination with respect to an entire lot or 
group of lots." 
The court however determined otherwise, ~tating that this 
"result would not follow ... It is clear from what 
has been said that the defendant's action must be 
reasonable and taken in good faith." 
At another point, the court rejected the contention, 
" ... that standing alone the restrictive covenant 
requiring approval of plans would leave the pur-
chaser subject to the mere whim of the seller and 
would therefore be too indefinite to be enforced 
ignores the decisions cited which hold that the 
power to approve ... must not be exercised capri-
ciously or arbitrarily." 
1The application of this principle can be easily rec-
ognized where the language of construction loan agree-
ments has been in issue. In Weiss, Dreyfous & Seiferth, 
Inc v. Natchez Invest. Co., 140 So. 736 (Miss. 1932), e.g., 
the agreement contained the following provision: 
"If the conditions set forth ... above have been 
fulfilled and evidence of such fulfillment has been furnish~d to the Trustee by written certificate of 
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(the architects), then ... such payments shall be 
made directly to the contractor . . . provided, 
however, that the Trustee shall have the right, but 
shall be under no duty to do so, to verify the cor-
rectness of any such certificate, and to determine 
whether the aggregate amount of the balance due 
for work theretofore done thereunder exceeds the 
amount then remaining in said trust fund." 
Clearly, no qualitative difference exists between the reser-
vation of a right to verify that performance has been 
proper, and the right to use discretion in the first instance 
to determine if disbursement is proper. The court reached 
this conclusion : 
"When these laborers' and materialmen's liens 
arose the laborers and materialmen had construc-
tive notice that the owner of the building had exe-
cuted a deed of trust thereon to secure the pay-
ment of money to be advanced for the purpose of 
paying for the labor and material therefore as the 
construction progressed . . . the parties to that 
deed of trust contemplated that its lien should be 
paramount, anid that the mortg.agee had no option 
as to making such advances, but was irrevocably 
bound to do so." (emphasis supplied) 
In E. K. Wood Lumber Co. v. Mulholland, 5 P. 2d 669 (Cal. 
App. 1931), a construction mortgage was also held to be 
one for obligatory advances, notwithstanding that the 
mortgagee through its representative obviously retain~d 
the right to disburse in its discretion, viz.: 
"Appellants further contend that the trial court 
erred in granting priority to the deeds of trust, 
as the advances made thereunder were optional, 
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citing W. P. Fidler & Co. v. McClitre, 191Pac.1027. 
The authority cited is not in point.11 The loan of 
$40,000 in the present case was agreed upon a 
typical building loan agreement providing that 
'said sum of $40,000 shall be advanced in such sum 
or smns as your .a•ppraiser or representative shall 
reconunend as the work progresses and not other-
wise." (emphasis supplied) 
This conclusion was reached as to the nature of the agree-
ment: 
"The only option given was in the time and amount 
of each advancement during the progress of the 
work. In the case cited CW. P. Fuller & ·Co.) it was 
definitely agreed that the mortgage was in no way 
bound to make any advances other than the initial 
advance of $1,600, the further advances were 
'merely voluntary advances.' " 
The facts of the instant transaction call for the same 
conclusion. The mortgagee did bind itself to disburse in 
accordance with the schedule set forth; however, it had a 
right to insist upon adequate performance as a condition 
of its obligation; if the performance failed to comply with 
the plans and specifications, on the basis of which the 
agreement was made, the schedule of payments would in-
evitably be subject to alteration. But, as noted in E. K. 
vVood Lnmber Co. v. Mulhollmnd, supra, an option as to 
time and amount of advances does not affect the obliga-
tory nature of the promise; rather it is the undertaking 
to pay upon performance that is controlling. 
11. It should be noted that the W. P. Fuller Co. decision, a case the 
court here found inapplicable to construction loans is one of the prin; 
cipal authorities relied upon by appellants. (See page 17, appellants 
brief.) 
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This result conforms to established rules of construc-
tion as well. Notably, that "whenever possible a contract 
should be so construed that there are mutually binding 
promises on each party. Ross v. Producers Mut. Ins. Co., 
4 U. 2d 396, 295 P. 2d 345. And, perhaps most importantly, 
that in determining both the "meaning and legal effect of 
an agreement, the transaction should be considered as a 
whole." Corbin, Contracts ~ 549, Caine v. Hagenbarth, 37 
U. 98, 106 Pac. 9-±5 (1910) 
Here the mortgagor wished to undertake certain con-
struction for which a loan was required; the lender agreed 
to advance the funds under the terms of an agreement 
which contemplated disbursement at various stages of 
construction, the security of the lender overall being de-
pendent upon completion of the structure in acco0rdance 
with plans and specifications. Can it be argued that, 
given the terms of such an arrangement, it was intended 
one party should not be bound to perform even though 
performance by the other fully complied with the condi-
tions of the agreement~ It is certain the purpose of neither 
party would be served under such a construction of the 
terms, since both the lender's security and the borrower's 
hope of profit are wholly dependent upon timely comple-
tion of the building. 
Caine v. Hagcnbarth, 37 U. 98, 106 Pac. 945 (1910), 
states: 
"vVhere one construction of a contract will make it 
unreasonable, unfair or unusual, and another con-
struction equally consistent with the language 
thereof, will make it reasonable, fair and just, the 
latter construction will prevail." 
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Beyond question the appellants, by lifting phrases 
out of the context and ref erring them to dictionary defi-
nitions rather than to the purpose and meaning of the 
transaction as a whole, have endeavored to pin a wholly 
unjustified construction upon the loan agreement relative 
to its disbursement provisions. r:l'he agreement, when con-
sidered in light of the relationship of the parties, the pur-
pose in entering into the arrangement and the goal sought 
to be achieved, clearly created mutually binding promises 
in accordance with its terms. 
(B) THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN AC-
CORDING PRIORITY TO ADVANCES MADE 
BY RESPONDEN1T TO COMPLETE THE 
STRUCTURE FOLLOWING DEFAULT UN-
DER THE LOAN AGREEMENT. THE RIGHT 
OF COMPLETION WAS CONFERRED BY 
THE AGREEMENT AND SECURED BY THE 
PRIOR MORTGAGE TO THE SAME EXTENT 
AS OTHER PROVISIONS. ITS EXERCISE 
WAS REQUIRED TO PRESERVE THE IN-
TERESTS OF ALL PARTIES. 
At the date of abandonment of work on lot 10, the 
house was half completed. (See Appellants' Brief P. 26) 
The Court can fully appreciate the condition of resi-
dential property under these circumstances, it is believed, 
without further note. 
Cottonwood Construction Company was obligated 
under the loan agreement to complete the structure in 
accordance with its terms. Respondent was accordingly 
bound to make progress payments. Upon the mortgagor's 
breach, Respondent was required to determine which 
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course of those provided for in the agreement it would 
follow. It could have proceeded with foreclosure. Instead, 
it chose to complete the structure, employing appellants 
among others for that purpose. 
Appellants argue that by so doing the nature of the 
arrangement was thereby transformed so as to confer a 
priority on the lienors to the amounts expended after 
default, notwithstanding their subordinate position prior 
to that time. 
In truth, the loan agreement and all its provisions, 
including those which governed the rights of the parties 
upon breach, were secured by the mortgage as fully as 
was the note. By proceeding to complete the house the 
mortgagee simply fulfilled the obligation of the mort-
gagor through exercise of a right plainly accorded by 
the loan agreement. 
Appellants in contrast were not parties to the loan 
agreement, and it was clearly not executed for their 
benefit. Nor, it might be added, did appellants enter into 
the transaction with the purpose or even reasonable ex-
pectation of achieving priority. They would appear to 
have no valid concern therefore with the mortgagee's 
rights upon breach of the loan agreement. 
This was recognized in Hayward Lumber & Invest-
ment Co. v. Corbett, Calif. 33 P. 2d 41, (1934) where a 
lien claimant whom the court specifically found to be 
subordinate to a prior construction mortgage questioned 
the lender's right to complete the structure following 
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abandonment by the mortgagor. The purpose was obvi-
ously to assert priority over amounts advanced after de-
fault. The court however ruled: 
"In view of the oblilgation requiring the money to 
be set over for the particular purpose of construct-
ing the building only, and by reason of the obliga-
tion on the part of the (mortgagor) to expediti-
ously proceed to completion, it may not be said 
that the respondent erroneously proceeded in the 
place of (the mortgagor) to complete the building, 
using only such money as was set over for that 
purpose by the (mortgagee) to (the mortgagor's) 
account. (The mortgagor) would have been power-
less to have used the money in question for any 
other purpose but the construction of the building. 
It may be that (the mortgagor) might question 
the (mortgagee's) right to proceed in his stead, 
but it does not fallow from this that (lien claim-
ant) also may rm'se this question." (emphasis 
supplied) 
Bennett v. Worcester County National Bank, -------· 
Mass. ________ , 213 N.E. 2d 254 (1966), is a recent illustration 
of the fact that courts today will not accept mechanical 
application of the theory proposed by appellants, but will 
consider the transaction realistically in light of attendant 
circumstances. In the Bennett cast>, a construction mort-
gagee completed a building following default by the mort-
gagor, and an unsuccessful attempt to sell the uncom-
pleted structure on foreclosure. The construction loan 
agreement itself contained basically the same provisions 
as that in issue, viz. : 
"In the event the contractor fails to complete the 
construction of the building within a reasonable 
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time, Bamk shall thereupon have the right but 
shall not be bound to take immediate possession 
of said premises and proceed to complete the 
bidding ... and Bank is authorized to charge all 
money expended for said completion against any 
money not already advanced." (emphasis sup-
plied) 
At the time of default, some $133,000 had been advanced 
under the construction lo.an agreement. The best offer 
received by mortgagee upon advertising the property in 
an uncompleted state was $95,000. The mortgagee there-
upon expended an additional $60,000 to complete the 
structure and it was ultimately sold. 
Plaintiffs were junior mortgagees who were clearly 
subordinate at the time of default under the construction 
mortgage. Their argument to achieve priority in the 
sums advanced for completion exactly parallels that of 
appellants here, viz: 
"The plaintiffs contend that upon (the mortga-
gor's) breach by failure to complete the building 
the bank's obligation to advance money for the 
project ceased by the terms of the agreement, the 
bank becoming a "volunteer'' as to any sums sub-
sequently advanced and thereby not entitled to 
charge them against the foreclosure proceeds ... 
Accordingly, the plaintiffs would limit the barnk's 
recovery to the $133,608.93 advanced up to the 
time of the breach." 
The court denied plaintiffs' asserted priority, with the 
following observation on the merit of their theory: 
"This arcrument ignores the fact that the bank ex-
pressly r~served the right to complete the building, 
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and that (the mortgagor's) fatilure to complete 
violated a covenant, the performance of which was 
secured by the mortgage." (emphasis supplied) 
The result in Bennett is a realistic appraisal of con-
struction financing. The object and indeed sine qua non 
of the entire transaction is erection of the completed 
structure. 'The loan agreement is the vehicle adopted by 
the parties to accomplish this end, and its provisions, 
including those governing rights upon breach, are secured 
by the mortgage. An attempt to superimpose a formal 
theory of "optional advances" to reverse the priority 
contemplated by the parties the court rejected as incom-
patible with the real objectives of the transaction. 
No contention is now made that appellants acted in 
other than full awareness of the purposes for which Re-
spondent's mortgage was executed. They should not now 
be heard to assert a belated priority based on exercise of 
a right secured by that mortgage. 
COMPLETION - ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
It must finally be asked what real justification ap-
pellants propose for their claim to priority. For not even 
appellants, it would appear, are content with bald appli-
cation of the optional advance concept. 
Rather, the justification is said to be in the fact that 
at the time o.f breach the lender "was amply protected 
by the buffer afforded by the land value." And, in addi-
tion, that by "waiting and taking over the venture ... the 
lender undertook to enhance its own position at the ex-
pense of already disadvantaged lienors." 
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This is patently incongruous. A half completed house 
is unquestionably less than half a loaf. It is not an ade-
quate "buff er" for a construction mortgagee nor was 
it ever so intended; moreover, it would have provided 
no security whatever for the suborinate lien claimants. 
It has been aptly noted that, 
" ... until a building has been completed, its in-
trinsic value is greatly impaired No one will buy 
a lawsuit or an uncompleted structure, except at 
a sizeable discount." (Shinehouse, Real Estate 
Construction Loan-A Synopsis, 33 Pa. Bar 
Ass'n Q. 63 (1961) 
The lienors in this situation stood only to benefit from 
the mortgagee's willingness to undertake to complete 
the house. 
It is well settled that advances made for the pro-
tection of the security of the mortgage are not optional 
but will be treated as obligatory advances entitled to the 
priority of the mortgage. This is true even though the 
mortgagee is under no obligation to make such advance-
ments by the terms of the mortgage or otherwise. In-
cluded under this heading are advances for taxes, insur-
ance, upkeep or repair, or for completion of the improve-
men t.12 
12. See generally 36 Am. Jur., Mortgages §§316-321; Osborne, Mo~­
gages §120; Crofts v. Johnson, Utah, 313 P. 2d 808 (1957); Columbia 
Trust Co. v. Farmer's & Merchant's Bank, Utah, 22 P.2d 164 (1933). 
An interesting case in this connection is Miller v. Ward, 88 Atl. 400 
(Maine 1931), where a mortgagee who had adva~ced funds for .the 
erection of an improvement and had taken possess10n of the premises 
upon default of the mortgagor was held to have not only the right but 
" ... the duty ... having taken possession ... with a house nearly fin-
ished but untenantable . . . to protect the interests of the mortgagor 
(by) the finishing of the house ... and thereby changing it from un-
productive property to income producing property." 
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The same conclusion has been readlPd not\\-ithstand-
ing that the rights of a junior liPnhoMic'r \nre im-olwd. 
In Logan-Moore Lumber Co. v. Bour:r.sock, 100 Kansas 
328 ( 1917) 16-± Pae. 156, the owner abandoned the con-
struction of several houses under agreem0nts whieh called 
for the expenditure of approximately $2,300 for com-
pletion. At the time of abandonment, the improvements 
were estimated to be \vorth from $500 to $SOO. The mort-
gagee thereupon completed the buiklings according to 
plans, with the exception of a few minor additions. His 
right to priority for all amounts expended (except only 
the additions just noted) was upheld over the claim of 
a lienholder who had furnished certain materials prior 
to the breach. Although the question \\-as considered of 
whether the lienholder was barred by a \rniver of lien 
executed sometime earlier, it is clear the court did not 
treat it as germane to the issue of priority for swns ex-
pended after breach. Rather, the matter of priority for 
these sums is considered on its own merits, and it is be-
lieved the court's conclusions are instructive as to the 
validity of the position taken by appellants here, viz.: 
" ... As (the mortgagor) had abandoned the prop-
erty with the buildings inrornplete and in such 
condition as to deteriorate rapidly, unless some-
thing were done to preserve them, it was natural 
and proper that (the mortgagee) should assume 
control and take steps to that end ... Here, before 
31 
(the mortgagee) began work upon the completion 
of the buildings, he had a first lien for $2, 700. The 
two lots were worth but $2,500. The (lienholder's) 
second lien was therefore practically worthless as 
things stood. The only reasonable prospect of its 
realizing anything upon its claim was through the 
investment by someone of enough more money to 
give added value to what had a.Zready been done. 
The mere covering in of the incomplete buildings 
so as to protect them from the weather would not 
have accomplished this, nor have appreciably bet-
tered the (lienholder's) condition. The natural and 
reasonable metho,d of increasing the value of the 
pairtially constructed bu.ildings was to complete 
them according to the original design. Under the 
peculiar circumstances presented we think the 
trial court was justified in giving (the mortgagee) 
a first lien for money expended in this way." (em-
phasis supplied) 
In view of the state of construction in the case before 
the court, it would appear the rationale of Logan-Moore 
Lumber Company v. Bowersock will apply. 
Elmendorf-Anthony v. Dunn cited by Appellants in 
support of their argument really bears little relevance 
to this situation since in that case the mortgagee had 
disbursed all but $49.00 of a $2200.00 loan at the time of 
the breach. 
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Overall, it is apparent the provision in question here 
is a common, even standard, clause in construction financ-
ing arrangements. 13 Its presence is directly attributable 
to. the prime object of the transaction - completion of 
the structure according to plans. The foregoing discus-
sion, it is believed, demonstrates that the courts are not 
prepared to accept appellants' proposal to apply the 
optional advance concept in a rigid, mechanical fashion. 
They will, however, interpret the concept reasonably in 
light of the circumstances and refuse to apply it when 
obviously incompatible with the objectives of the trans-
action involved. 
POINT IL 
•THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DETER-
MINING THAT THE FACTS SUBMITTED BY THE 
AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DID NOT CONS'l1ITUTE 
"COMMENCEMENT TO DO WORK OR FURNISH 
M.A:TERIALS ON THE GROUND FOR THE STRUC-
TURE OR IMPROVEMENT" WITHIN THE MEAN-
ING OF 38-1-5 UCA (1953). 
13. The Building Loan Agreement of the Federal Housing Admin-
istration (form No. 2441) contains similar provisions. Paragraph 10 of 
said Building Loan Agreement contains the following language: 
"If the borrower at any time prior to the completion of the 
project abandons the same or ceases work thereon for a period 
of more than 20 days or fails to complete the erection of th.e 
project strictly in accordance with the drawings and speci-
fications ... or otherwise fails to comply with the terms here-
of, any such failure shall be a default he!eunder._ at the 
option of the lender, and the lender may termmate this agree-
ment, or the lender, at its option, at any time thereafter may 
enter into possession of the premises and perform any and 
all work and labor necessary to complete the improvements 
substantially according to drawings and specifications, and 
employ a watchman to protect the premises from injury, all 
sums so expended by lender to be deemed paid to borrower 
and secured by said mortgage." 
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(A) THE PRIORITY OF MECHANICS' LIENS 
UNDER THE UTAH STATUTE IS CONTIN-
GENT UPON 'THE TIME OF COMMENCE-
MENT OF WORK OR FURNISHING OF MA-
TERIALS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL BUILD-
INGS OR SiTRUCTURES AGAINST WHICH 
SUCH L,IENS ARE CLAIMED. IN ORDER TO 
SERVE AS BASIS FOR PRIORITY OVER 
OTHER ENCUMBRANCES THE INITIAL 
WORK MUST BE SUCH AS TO PROVIDE 
CLEAR AND VISIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE 
COMMENCEMENT OF THE BUILDING IT-
SELF. PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS, SUCH 
AS THE PREPARATION OF A SURVEY, OR 
THE CONS1TRUCTION OF OFF-SITE IM-
PROVEMENTS DO NOT MEET THIS RE-
QUIREMENT. 
Priority among mechanics' lien claimants, mort-
gagees and other encumbrancers is governed by ~ 38-1-5, 
U.C.A. (1953), which, in relevant part, provides that liens 
of the first mentioned group, 
"shall relate back, and take effect as of the time 
of the commencement to do work or furnish ma-
terials on the ground for the structure or improve-
ment, and shall have priority over any lien, mort-
gage or other encumbrance which may have 
attached subsequently to the time when the build-
ing improvement or structure was commenced, 
wo;k begun, or first material furnished on the 
ground." (emphasis added) 
The language of 38-1-5 suggests three conditions 
which must be satisfied before a lien claim may take prior-
ity over a record mortgage: 
34 
(1) work on the building, structure or improve-
ment, or initial furnishing of materials must 
precede recordation of the mortgage; 
(2) the initial work or furnishing of materials 
must be on the ground or site upon which the 
building is being erected; and 
(3) the initial work or furnishing of materials 
must be for the building proposed to be con-
structed, and hence clearly recognizable as 
the beginning of such construction. 
'The first of these conditions is clearly acknowledged 
m Utah Savings and Loan Association v. Mecham, 12 
Utah 2d 335, 366 P 2d 598 (1961), where, in discussing 
the rival claims of certain mechanic lienors and a mort-
gagee, the court states : 
"Our law provides that a properly recorded mort-
gage has priority over a mechanic's lien for work 
or labor furnished but which has commenced after 
the recordation of the mortgage." 
The plain meaning of the statute establishes the sec-
ond condition. Thus 38-1-5 provides that the liens "relate 
back to ... the time when the building, improvement or 
structure was commenced, work begun, or first material 
furnished on the groitnd." 1This latter phrase qualifies 
each of the preceding events and obviously requires that 
the initial performance take place on the site of the 
contemplated construction. 
As to the third, the terms of the act provide that 
priority is contingent upon the "commencement to do 
work or furnish materials ... for the strncture or im-
provement." 
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The general rule as to what constitutes the com-
mencement of wo.rk on a building is contained in 57 
Corpus Juris Secundum, Mechanic's Liens, P. 179. 
"The commencement of the building or improve-
ment within the meaning of mechanic's liens stat-
utes is the visible commencement of actual opera-
tions on the ground for the erection of the build-
ing, the doing of some wo.rk or labor on the ground, 
such as beginning to excavate for the foundation, 
or work of like description which every one can 
readily see and recognize as the commencement 
of a building, and which is done with the intention 
and purpose then formed to continue the work 
until the completion of the building." 
"On the other hand, work which, although it may 
improve the property, is merely preparatory to 
building operations at some future time, and does 
not of itself tend to contribute directly to the erec-
tion, such as clearing, leveling, filling up, or f enc-
ing the property ... does not constitute a com-
mencement for the purpose of fixing the time to 
which the lien relates. Also staking out the plan 
of the building or the boundary line of the tract, 
does not constitute a commencement of the build-
ing within the meaning of the lien statutes." 
See, also, Jones, Liens~ 1469, 1474. 
UTAH DECISIONS 
The relevant decisions in this jurisdiction are in 
accord with the general view requiring for priority pur-
poses, the initial performance of work or furnishing of 
materials to be made in connection with, and provide 
clear evidence of the commencement of, the building or 
improvement sought to be liened. In Teahen v. Nelson, 6 
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U. 363, 23P. 764, for example, the court stated the follow-
ing in commenting on an earlier version of 38-1-5, viz.: 
"Section 3810 of the same chapter prefers the 
lien given in the chapter to any other that may 
have attached or been created subsequent to the 
time when the building, improvement or structure 
was commenced; also to any such lien of which the 
lienholder had no notice, and which was unre-
corded at the time the building was commenced. 
This section requires other lienholders, by mort-
gage, or otherwise, to take notice of the com-
mencement of work on the building." (emphasis 
supplied) 
In Stanton Transportation Company v. Davis, 9 U. 
2d 184, 341 P. 2d 207, (1959) an action foreclosing liens in 
connection with services and materials used for an oil well 
drilling rig, the Utah Supreme Court was called upon 
to decide the time at which a lien for labor or materials 
should attach as well as exactly "What materials or ser-
vices are lienable items under the statutes. The court 
granted a lien for labor in erecting the drilling rig on 
the wellsite but rejected the lien claim for labor and ex-
penses in transporting the drilling rig to the wellsite. The 
relevant language of the court follows: 
"The purpose of the lien statutes is to protect 
those who have added directly to the value of 
property by performing labor or furnishing ma-
terials upon it. (Emphasis supplied) 
'The court further said: 
"The lien given to contractors and laborers spe-
cified the "performing labor upon, or furnishing 
materials to be used in ... or repair ... building 
... or improvement upon (the) land." If the more 
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general phrase "or in concerning which'' were 
controlling as to that class of lien claimants, the 
specific language requiring the work or materials 
to be upon the property would be idle verbiage . 
. . . (2, 3) While it is true that our statutes are 
to be liberally construed to give effect to their 
purpose and to promote justice it is equally true 
that they should not be distorted beyond the intent 
of the legislature. This principle is particularly 
applicable in a situation of this kind where a 
liability is imposed upon the property owner be-
yond what he contracted to bear for the improve-
ment of his property. In order to impose upon 
him such additional burdens the law must clearly 
spell out the responsibility. Otherwise, the enter-
ing into a contract for the improvement of one's 
property might open the door to lmforeseeable 
risks for the property owner. He is aware of the 
amount of work to be done upon his property and 
fairly may be charged with knowledge of the ex-
tent thereof. But that is not true of peripheral 
work that may be in some remote way related to 
the contractor's activities. 
Also, Morrison v. Carey Lombard Co. 9 U, 33 P 238, 
(1893) Carey-Lombard Lumber Co. v. Partridge, 10 U. 
332, 37 P. 572, (1894) and Morrison v. Inter-Mountain 
Salt Co. 14 U. 201, 46 P. 1104 (1896) where the attach-
ment of liens is clearly made dependent upon the furnish-
ing of work and materials for the bitilding or improve-
ment. 
OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
Generally, work of a preliminary nature and not 
directly involved in commencement of the structure itself 
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has been rejected as the date for the attachment of claims 
of parties performing labor or furnishing materials sub-
sequent to the recording of a mortgage on the property. 
North Shaker Boulevard Co. v. Harriman Nat. Bank, 
153 N.E. 909 (Ohio Ct. A. 1926) is an instance. Here 
certain materialmen who had furnished supplies to the 
premises sought to achieve priority over a prior mort-
gage on the theory that "work, construction, or improve-
ment" had been commenced on the property prior to the 
recording o.f the mortgage. This contention was based on 
the presence on the property of steamshovels, the location 
of test holes, the driving of stakes, and other work of a 
similar nature prior to the recording of the mortgage. 
Rejecting the claim of the materialmen for priority, the 
court states the following as the test to be applied in the 
determination of whether work had been commenced as 
contemplated by the statute: 
" ... was the work, improvement, or construction 
of such a nature that apparently, obviously and 
visibly it formed in and of itself a component part 
of the structure, so that when the structure arose 
from the ground the work, improvement, or con-
struction commenced prior to the mortgage would 
appear as part of the structure itself, as a physical 
identity, which, speaking in its own behalf, would 
indicate the situation prior to the recording of the 
recording of the mortgage 1" 
Rupp v. Cline & Sons, Inc. 188 A. 2d 146 (Md. 1963) 
is the most recent expression on the subject. A Lien claim-
ant sought priority in the proceeds of a foreclosure sale 
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under a deed of trust which had been recorded approxi-
mately four months after the claimant had graded the 
mortgaged land, but before the claimant began actual 
excavation for a proposed apartment development. 
The Maryland mechanics lien statute is similar to 
the Utah Statute in providing that the lien conferred 
takes priority over mortgages and other encumbrances 
which "attach upon the said building or the ground cov-
ered thereby subsequent to the commencement thereof 
... " In determining that the initial work done by the 
claimant did not fix the time to which liens could relate, 
the Court made these observations: 
" ... before there can be the commencement of a 
building which would give a mechanic's lien claim-
ant a preference over a recorded mortgage there 
must be (1) a manifest commencement of some 
work or labor on the ground which overyone can 
readily see and recognize as the conunencement 
of a building and ( 2) the work done must have 
been begun with the intention and purpose then 
formed to continue the work until the completion 
of the building." 
Finding these elements absent in the instant case, it was 
concluded that while: 
" ... the removal of soil had the effect of leveling 
the apartment site, that fact did not constitute 
commencement for the purpose of fixing the time 
to which a lien could relate ... nor did the grading 
or leveling - since there was no work on the 
ground which everyone could readil_Y ~ee and re-
cognize as the commencement of a bmldmg - have 
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the effect of putting the party making the con-
struction loan on notice that the building had been 
commenced ... " 
The lien claimants are unable to meet either of these 
tests. Neither the work of surveying or construction of 
roads and sidewalks, water mains, sewer mains and lat-
erals or utility poles can be considered sufficient to give 
notice of proposed construction on the individual lots. 
In addition, it is obvious there was not the necessary 
continuity between the initial operations - the survey 
was made in early 1960, the roads, sidewalks, water mains, 
sewer mains and laterals were not constructed until over 
a year had elapsed and initial construction on the home 
did not begin for another eighteen months thereafter -
to show the "intention and purpose then formed to con-
tinue the (preliminary) work until the completion of 
the building." 
(See also Fryman v. McGhee, 163 N.E. 2d 63 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1958); Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Birzer Building Co. 
101 N.E. 2d 408 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950); Erickson v. Ire-
land, 158 N.W. 918 (Minn. 1916); Central Trust Co. v. 
Cameron Iron & Goal Co. 47 Fed. 136 (Cir. W.D. Pa. 
1891); Kiene v. Hodge, 57 N.vV. 717 (Ia. 1894) Puseig & 
Jones v. Pa. Paper Mills, 173 Fed. 634 (1909); W·aird v. 
Vannelle, 91 N.E. 7) 
(B) WHE!THER THE PRELIMINARY WORK IS 
ITSELF LIENABLE UNDER THE STATUTE 
HAS NO RELEVANCY TO THE QUE8TION 
OF PRIORITY BE:TWEEN THE MORTGA-
GEES AND THE LIEN CLAIMANTS. THE 
ISSUE OF PRIORITY IS, RATHER, CONTIN-
GENT SOLELY UPON THE DE1TERMINA-
TION OF WHETHER ACTS OCCURRED ON 
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THE PREMISES SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE 
CLEAR EVIDENCE OF THE COMMENCE-
MENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL HOUSE PRIOR 
TO REICORDATION OF THE MORTGAGES. 
Priority between mechanics and materialmen on the 
one hand and a mortgagee on the other is a matter en-
tirely distinct from the question of what is or is not lien-
able under the statute. 
Erickson v. Ireland. 158 N.W. 918 (Minn. 1916) 
points up the distinction sharply. The lien claimants here 
sought to relate their claims back to the time of the 
architect's preparation of plans. 1The work done by the 
architect had predated recordation of a construction 
mortgage on the premises, while the work and materials 
furnished by the lien claimants had post-dated such re-
cording. The relevant statute contained this language: 
"All such liens as against the owner of the land 
shall attach and take effect from the time the 
first item of material or labor is furnished upon 
the premises for the beginning of the improve.-
ment, and shall be pref erred to any mortgage or 
other incumbrance not then of record unless the 
lienholder had actual notice thereof."• 
An earlier case, Lamoreaux v. Andersch, 150 N.W. 
908 Minn. (1915) established the right of an architect to 
*Another clause of this provision reads as follows: 
"As against a bona fide purchaser, mortgagee or incumbrancer 
without notice, however, no lien shall attach prior to the actual 
and visible beginning of the im~rovemi;nt on. !he g~ound." 
The court found it unnecessary to consider this provision, smce, for the 
purpose of answering the argument of the lien claimants, it accepted 
their assertion that the mortgagee had notice and thus was in the 
same position as the owner. It will be noted that the statutory language 
considered by the court is basically the language of 38-1-5, U.C.A. 
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a lien on the property, regardless of whether the improw-
ment for which his services were required ·was completed. 
The court in the instant case noted the lien claimants' re-
liance on this decision in stating the issue as follows: 
"It is contended that as a result of the decision in 
the Andersch Case all liens must be held to attach 
as against the owner and mortgagees with notice 
claiming under him as of the time the architect 
commenced to prepare his plans." 
This argument was flatly rejected: 
"It was not held in the Andersch Case that where 
a building is actually constructed, liens attach as 
against the mvner of the land as of the time the 
architect commences the preparation of his plans. 
·we cannot so hold here. The statute does not admit 
of such construction. 
"The language of the statute, when applied to a 
case where a building is actually constructed is 
not doubtful. In plain terms it says that: 
'All .... liens .... attach and take effect 
from the time the first item of material 
or labor is furnished upon the premises 
for the beginning of the improvement.' 
"If anything more need be said, we might say 
that the provision that mechanics' liens should be 
pref erred to any mortgage or other incumbrance, 
not of record at the time of furnishing such first 
item of material or labor unless the lienholder 
had actual notice thereof, leads to the inference 
that it was intended that such liens were not to 
be preferred to any mortgage which was th~n. of 
record ... it was not the intent of the decision 
to throw doubt on the meaning of this langua~e 
as applied to the usual case where improvement is 
made on the ground. 
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"\Ve hold that when a building is erected all liens 
attach at the time the first item of material or 
labor is furnished on the ground. The result is 
that the mortgage is prio.r to the liens." (emphasis 
added) 
Rupp v. Cline & Sons, Inc. Supra, is another case in 
point. 
Thus, regardless o.f whether a lien can be asserted 
for the work done or materials furnished, the question 
of priority remains dependent upon the same factors, 
namely, the performance of acts on th~ premises suffi-
cient to give notice of the commencement of the building. 
National Lumber Co. v. Farmer & Son, Inc., 87 N.W. 
2d 32 (Minn. 1957) also contains a clear acknowledgment 
of the distinction between lienability of services or ma-
terials furnished and the right to priority. In determin-
ing that the erection of a fence on the premises before a 
mortgage was recorded did not confer priority on parties 
iierforming labor or furnishing materials for the con-
struction of a building subsequent to the recordation, the 
court made this analysis : 
"Appellants' first contention is that the fence 
constituted an actual visible improvement upon 
(the) premises. Of this there can be no doubt. Nor 
can there be any doubt that the case of the fence 
would have been a lienable item if the bill ... had 
not been paid ... It is not important that the com-
pany which provided the fence later furnished 
materials in the construction of the dwelling for 
it need only be demonstrated that the fence con-
stituted "the actual and visible beginning of the 
improvement on the ground' in order for the lien 
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to attach. When a building is erected all liens at. 
tach at the time the first item of material or labor 
is furnished on the ground." 
After considering several Minnesota cases dealing 
with the doctrine of "relation back" for purposes of 
priority under the mechanic's lien statute, the court con-
cluded: 
" . . it appears that the line of distinction is 
whether or not the improvement bears directly on 
the construction of the building rather than whe-
ther it is part of the overall project involved." 
In this light the court affirmed the finding below 
that "the fencing was not the beginning of the improve-
ment within the meaning of (the statute) ... and that 
the erection of the fence was severable and separable from 
the later work." 
·The same reasoning is applicable to the facts at hand. 
First, the initial platting of the subdivision and the con· 
struction of roads and other "off-site" improvements, 
did not constitute the "commencement" of the building, 
and, second, even though such work is deemed to be lien 
able and part of the overall work on the subdivision, it 
is clearly "separate and severable" from actual construe· 
tion of the individual lots. 
Appellants have relied on the case of United States 
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Midvale Home Finance Corp. SG 
U. 506, 44 P. 2d 1090 ( 1935) and cases cited therein to 
support their position. It is true that the Midvale Home 
Finance Corp. case did involve a contest for priority 
between Mechanic's lien claimants and the mortgagee. Jn 
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that case, however, both the lien claimants and the mort-
gage\~ asserted liens against the entire subdivsion, rather 
than against individual lots. The question of preliminary 
work or off-site improvements as a basis for the attach-
ment of lien claims is not mentioned in the case. Rather, 
it is apparent that actual construction of the homes was 
commenced before the mortgage was recorded and the 
lien claimants were engaged in such construction from 
the out-set. Thus, the Court in MIDVALE was faced 
simply with a situation where the visible beginnings of 
construction on the subdivision improvements were com-
menced prior to the recordation of the mortgage, and both 
lien claimants and mortgagee looked to the tract as a 
whole for their security. In the case before the Court, 
the parties have looked to the individual lots for security, 
individual mortgages having been recorded on each lot 
and notices of lien filed by lien claimants on individual 
lots. Thus, the lien claims must be evaluated separately 
as to each residence. The Midvale holding would require 
here, as in the case of liens asserted against the entire 
subdivision, that actual construction on the improvements 
on the individual lots precede recordation of the mort-
gage. 
SUMMARY 
If mechanics liens are to prevail over the lien of a 
recorded mortgage, the commencement of work or fur-
nishing of materials must both precede the recordation 
of a mortgage and provide clear evidence of the begin-
nings of the erection of the building itself. Preliminary 
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and offsite operations such as were involved here are 
wholly insufficient to satisfy this requirement. The fact 
that the preliminary work may itself be lienable under 
the statute is of no consequence on the question of prior-
ity, in the absence of an adequate showing that the work 
in fact constituted the commencement of the building 
sought to be liened. 
By the record before the Court it is clear that none 
of the lien claimants furnished labor or material upon 
Lot 10, for the home upon the lot until the mortgage in 
favor of Respondent had been recorded. 
Carried to its logical conclusion, the argument ad-
vanced by the lien claimants would in the normal case, 
preclude a mortgagee from achieving priority over the 
liens of parties subsequently furnishing labor or ma-
terials for the construction of improvements, since work 
in the form of a survey or the construction of roads and 
sidewalks nearly always precedes actual construction of 
the building. This result is manifestly contrary to the 
intention of the parties, and is appropriately avoided by 
the statute and relevent case law which uniformly require 
the initial work to provide suitable evidence of the com-
mencement of the building itself. The language of Sec. 
38-1-10, placing all liens upon an equal footing does not 
alter the fact that this requirement must be met before 
any liens will attach to the individual lots. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing argument, respondent 
respectfully prays that this Court affirm the trial court's 
interlocutory order appealed from: 
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1. By determining that the advances made by re-
spondent under the construction mortgage were obliga-
tory and took priority as of the date of recording the 
mortgage. 
2. By determining that the advances made by re-
spondent to complete the house on Lot 10 following de-
fault were made pursuant to the loan agreement and 
took priority as of the date of recording the mortgage. 
3. By determining that the facts submitted by the 
affidavits in support of the motion for summary judg-
ment did not constitute "commencement to do work or 
furnish materials on the ground for the structure or im-
provements" within the meaning of 38-lc- 5 Utah Code 
Annotated ( 1953) 
4. Awarding to respondent its costs incurred herein. 
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